Case Studies of Punjab accord(INDIA)

Introduction

Punjab accord, also known as the Rajiv-Longowal Accord, is an accord signed by Rajiv Gandhi and Harchand Singh Longowal on 24 July 1985. The government accepted the demands of Akali Dal who in turn agreed to withdraw their agitation.

The accord attracted opposition from several orthodox Sikh leaders of Punjab as well as from the politicians of Haryana. Some of its promises could not be fulfilled due to the disagreements. Harchand Singh Longowal was assassinated by the Sikh militants opposed to the accord.Sikhs, launched a Dharam Yudh Morcha which sought to restore Punjab’s constitutional rights along with granting Sikhs’ their religious rights which had already been granted to other communities. The Sikh struggle which was branded as a secessionist movement trying to break up India.

Causes of conflict

• The Sikh struggle in India from 1947 has been on the basis that the Punjab State must be treated equally as other Indian states. In 1966, Punjabi State was established but the Center government took calculated and deliberate steps in order to dwarf the State and prevent its economic growth. 
• Two new states of Himachal and Haryana consisting of Hindu majority were carved out of Punjab reducing the size of the Punjab State. Many of the Punjabi speaking areas were given to Haryana. 
• Punjab’s capital city, Chandigarh, was declared a Union territory directly under the management of the Center government. Control and management of Punjab’s resources especially waters and hydel power became the subjects of the Center government. Also, more than 75% of Punjab’s water was diverted to non-riparian states of Haryana and Rajasthan. 
The chief demand and the basis of the Dharam Yudh Morcha was that river waters belonged to Punjab and that the issue should be referred to the Supreme Court, since any sharing with or transfer of Punjab waters to non-riparian states was unconstitutional and S.Y.L. Canal, being in violation of the riparian rights of Punjab, should be stopped.
• Such moves were not only unconstitutional but also destructive to the growth of Punjab. Nowhere else in India are State’s waters controlled by the Center or State’s waters freely given to non-riparian states. Also, nowhere else in India is the same capital shared between two states. To make matters worse, no State government was allowed to remain in power or function in Punjab for more than a year if it did not please the Center’s policies.

The dismissal of the Punjab state government, imposition of President’s Rule and Operation Blue Star were some of the key policy moves during this time.The government launched two operations :

Operation Blue Star: Punjab was cut off from the rest of the world and placed under the army rule. Sikh holy center, Darbar Sahib, was attacked along with several other Gurdwaras throughout Punjab. Thousands of innocent Sikhs were massacred and the damage done to the Sikh psyche was irreplaceable

Operation Wood Rose:all Amrithdari Sikhs were declared as terrorists and the army was given orders to eliminate them from all villages and cities in Punjab.

Both operations were launched to subvert the Sikh agitation, suppress the Sikh voice of constitutional demands and keep the Sikh minority under the majority Hindu rule.

Signing of the Accord

The Memorandum also called the Rajiv—Longowal Accord ran into the following 11 clauses:

1. Compensation to innocent persons killed

2. Army Recruitment

3. Enquiry into November incidents

4. Rehabilitation of those discharged from the Army

5. All India Gurdwara Act

6. Disposal of Pending Cases

7. Territorial Claims

8. Centre State Relations

9. Sharing of River Waters

10. Representation of Minorities

11. Promotion of Punjabi Language

Analysis and Conclusions

The pattern of security policy in Punjab suggests that the Indian state’s reluctance to take the situation seriously in its early stages was in part what caused the downward spiral thereon. According to the Indian state, the absence of violence, and the functioning of an elected state government, are signs of the end of the conflict and constitute a return to ‘normalcy’. However, rather than any effective resolution, the conflict in Punjab was ultimately ‘managed’. ‘Conflict management’ suggests that actors in conflicts can be directly controlled and that the goal is the reduction of violence rather than any long-term commitment to addressing the root causes of the problem.

In particular, the establishment of an elected state government and the reduction of violence are considered the twin parameters of judging ‘normalcy’. The ‘Punjab strategy’ has given credence to the argument made by more hawkish policymakers that conflicts can be defeated without any major concession and without undermining the Indian state.

This has been detrimental to the long-term resolution of the conflict and as can be observed in other internal conflicts across India, such as Kashmir and the conflicts in the north-eastern part of the country, Conflict management has been the preferred policy in India’s internal security strategy. Conflict management in this context has come to mean the crushing of violence by force, followed by minor concessions that include elections and development aid. It is plain that the Accord was for the Government a treaty of victory, since it gave them everything they had tried to secure in the earlier decades, and was a complete surrender of every demand and every right the Sikhs had struggled for since 1966.